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THE ALI PRINCIPLES ON
TRANSNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY DISPUTES: WHY INVITE
CONFLICTS?
Rochelle Dreyfuss∗
INTRODUCTION

A

s those members of the innovation community who focus
on procedural law know, the American Law Institute
(ALI)1 is engaged in a project to facilitate litigation of intellec2
tual property disputes that cross national borders. The enterprise owes its origins to the 1999 Draft of the Convention on
Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters, negotiated at the
Hague Conference on Private International Law.3 By now, it
has undergone several iterations. Columbia University Professor Jane Ginsburg and I used the Hague material as the starting point for proposing a stand-alone convention dealing not
only with the general problems of international litigation, but
also with issues that uniquely arise when intangible rights are
at stake.
Our work, which was first presented at a Chicago-Kent College of Law symposium in October 2001,4 attracted the attention of the ALI. After arranging a further presentation in April
2002, the Institute formally adopted the project as its own. It
∗ Pauline Newman Professor of Law, NYU School of Law.
1. The Brooklyn Law School Symposium discussion focused on Preliminary Draft No. 3, which was made available to Symposium participants in
October 2004.
2. ALI PRINCIPLES—INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING
JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES
(Am. Law Inst. Preliminary Draft No. 3, Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter ALI Principles].
3. Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, adopted on Oct. 30, 1999, at http://
www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_drafte.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Draft Hague Convention].
4. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1065 (2002).
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appointed us, along with François Dessemontet of the University of Lausanne (Switzerland), as co-Reporters, and an international group of intellectual property lawyers, practitioners, and
judges as Advisers of the project, entitled Intellectual Property:
Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judg5
ments in Transnational Disputes. Revised drafts, now cast in
the form of principles that courts may follow, rather than as a
convention that nations must join, were presented to the Advisers in February of 2003 and 2004 and to a special session of the
ALI membership in May 2004. A new draft will be presented to
the Advisers in April 2005. It will be at least a year, probably
longer, before the ALI will formally consider approving the final
product. In the meantime, the Reporters are interested in
broad input. Accordingly, we are grateful to Professor Sam Murumba for the valuable opportunity to discuss our work at
Brooklyn Law School.
The current draft differs in many ways from the one initially
unveiled in Chicago. Of particular importance, it goes beyond
the issues of personal jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments—the issues that were at the heart of the Hague Convention—to cover choice of law. After explaining why a project tailored to intellectual property litigation is desirable and describing its key features, this paper discusses the decision to add
principles on applicable law and the factors that were considered in making specific choices.
I. THE HAGUE CONVENTION AND ITS APPLICATION TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
A convention on enforcement of foreign judgments has been
in gestation at the Hague Conference for over a decade. Begun
in 1992, the goal was to create an international analogue to the
U.S. system of according full faith and credit to sister state
judgments, and to the EU’s Brussels Regulation, which establishes a regime for recognizing judgments within the European
Union.6 That is, member states were to agree to recognize and
5. A full list of participants is available on the ALI website, at
http://www.ali.org (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
6. See State and Territorial Statutes and Judicial Proceedings; Full Faith
and Credit, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2004); Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of
22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
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enforce any judgment rendered by another member state, so
long as that judgment was predicated on a basis of personal jurisdiction approved under the convention. Conversely, members were to agree to refuse to recognize or enforce judgments
predicated on jurisdictional bases prohibited by the convention.7
Thus, the convention was to be comprised of essentially two
parts: one would list the bases of jurisdiction that were approved or prohibited, the other would set out conditions of enforcement.8
By 1999, a draft convention was promulgated, however it
quickly ran into significant opposition. To some extent, the
problems were substantive: states began with very different
approaches to adjudicatory authority and that made it difficult
to agree on specific jurisdictional provisions.9 Other issues were
technological: much of the drafting of the convention was completed before the advent of e-commerce. As a result, the negotiators barely considered a key source of future international
disputes. Mainly, however, the issue was lack of enthusiasm.
When the convention was first proposed, there was a strong
perception that judgments rendered in the United States were
difficult to enforce abroad, and that as a result, successful U.S.
litigants were shortchanged and U.S. law was arguably underJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 [hereinafter
Brussels Regulation].
7. Unlike the Brussels Regulation, which has only white (approved) bases
of jurisdiction and black (prohibited) bases, the Hague plan was to leave a
grey area where members could decide for themselves whether to recognize or
reject a judgment.
8. Recognition and enforcement are not the same thing. For example, a
judgment can be recognized for purposes of determining whether another
action can be filed without being at a point where it can be enforced for, say,
money damages. However, for purposes of convenience, the terms “enforced”
and “enforceable” will be used to cover both concepts unless specifically noted
otherwise.
9. For example, EU legislation tends to emphasize institutional considerations such as predictability and consumer protection, while U.S. case law,
which looks to the due process interests of each and every litigant, yields results that are more difficult to anticipate. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C.
Ginsburg, Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments
in Transnational Disputes, 2 COMPUTER L. REV. INT’L 33 (2003); Barbara S.
Wellbery & Rufus J. Pichler, Electronic Commerce and the Proposed Hague
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters—Putting the Cart Before the Horse?, 5 COMPUTER UND RECHT INT’L 129
(2001).
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enforced. The U.S. bar was therefore willing to engage in a
trade-off. It would sacrifice certain bases of jurisdiction that
were opposed abroad (such as general doing business jurisdiction and tag jurisdiction, which are viewed elsewhere as exorbitant) and in exchange, enforcement of other U.S. judgments
would become a near-certainty.10 However, by the time the
draft convention was promulgated, that trade-off was no longer
considered desirable. Because the U.S. market had become extremely attractive to foreign capital investment, in most significant cases, foreign litigants had sufficient assets within the
United States to satisfy judgments rendered against them.
With less need to find internationally accepted predicates for
jurisdiction, the enthusiasm within the United States for sacrificing familiar bases dissipated. And since the United States
tends to enforce foreign judgments, and within the EU, the
Brussels Regulation works well, there was a similar want of
interest abroad.
As of this writing, the Hague Conference has suspended work
on a general convention. Instead, it is taking a “bottom up” approach, which contemplates that agreements dealing with specific problems of international concern will be developed and
that as experience with these is garnered, it will become easier
to draft a general convention governing all private law disputes.
Thus, there is now a proposal pending at the Hague for an instrument on exclusive choice of court agreements. This convention would make enforceable judgments rendered by a court
chosen by business parties in a written contract.11 In addition,
the Hague Conference has urged practitioners and other interested parties to consider the wisdom and contours of agreements covering specific legal fields where international enforcement issues are particularly problematic.
10. See Draft Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 18 (d), (f), (i). This
would have been more of a sacrifice than might first meet the eye as even U.S.
judgments enforced in the United States would be subject to the prohibition
on tag and doing business jurisdiction if they involved litigants that were
citizens of other convention states.
11. See Draft on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements, Hague Conference
on Private International Law, Special Commission on Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters Apr. 2127, 2004, Work. Doc. No. 110E revised, available at http://www.ejtn.net/
www/en/resources/5_1095_1181_file.409.pdf.
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It can certainly be argued that intellectual property is one
such field. On the copyright side, markets are now global. U.S.
movies, television programs, and music have long enjoyed broad
audiences abroad, and in recent years, foreign works have begun to appeal to Americans. Population shifts have produced
diasporas—significant communities that consume works in one
language while living in locations where another is spoken. At
the same time, the Internet and other forms of digital transmissions have reduced the cost of reaching international markets
and decentralized the mechanisms of distributing intellectual
products. Many of these factors—along with the rise in international travel—have created a similarly global market for, and
knowledge of, trademarks.12 As to patents, the Internet is increasingly used to distribute patented software and to make
offers to sell tangible embodiments of patented inventions to
remote locations.13 There are also patents that are explicitly
drawn to the online environment. Some patents include socalled “divided” claims, which contemplate activity in more than
one jurisdiction.14 It is also becoming increasingly common for
those investing in innovation to rely on fairly global exploitation, especially now that there are international instruments
that make the acquisition of world-wide protection easier.15
12. See, e.g., William Patry, Choice of Law and International Copyright, 48
AM. J. COMP. L. 383 (2000) (attributing new interest in choice of law to the
same set of phenomena).
13. See, e.g., Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Litmer v. PDQUSA.com, 326 F. Supp. 2d 952 (N.D. Ind.
2004). See generally, Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality Waning? Patent
Infringement for Offering in the United States to Sell an Invention Abroad, 37
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701 (2004).
14. See, e.g., NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 392 F.3d 1336 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (claiming that utilization of the Blackberry infringes U.S. patent
law even though networks were located in Canada).
15. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights broadens the base of inventors who are eligible for patents in each
country. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Part II, § 5, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter
WTO Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS–RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 81, 93 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement]. The Patent Cooperation Treaty and the Convention on the Grant
of European Patents make it cheaper for investors to take advantage of the
TRIPS opportunity. See Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T.
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These changes put significant pressure on both the enforcement of intellectual property rights and on effective defenses
against infringement claims. A single Internet transmission
can simultaneously produce copyright and trademark infringements on a world-wide basis. Similarly, a business method can
be practiced on a server situated in one country, at the instigation of users located in a multiplicity of other states. As a result, rights holders now find that to fully protect their interests,
they must sue in more than one jurisdiction, and shoulder the
attendant risks of infringements occurring in places where the
defendant lacks assets, where there are insufficient contacts to
support adjudicatory authority, or where the law or the pace of
legal proceedings is especially disadvantageous. Indeed, the
ubiquity of the Internet’s infrastructure gives the users of intellectual property unprecedented ability to choose to operate from
precisely such locations.16 And in some instances, servers can
be artfully placed so that there is no one country where all the
steps of a patent are practiced—and therefore, arguably, no infringement anywhere.17
The globalization of intellectual property activities and communications also poses problems to potential defendants. Lacking the ability to predict when they will be subject to adjudicatory authority, consumers of intellectual property act at their
peril when they utilize material protected anywhere. Further7645, 9 I.L.M. 978; Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5,
1973, 13 I.L.M. 268.
16. This is not meant to exclude the possibility that nonInternet cases
could also require multiple enforcement efforts. For an example, see Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment Inc. v. Ball, [2004] E.W.H.C.
1738 (Ch. 2004) (Eng.), which involved the sale from the United Kingdom to
various other countries of chips circumventing technological protections to
certain Sony games. Under one of the statutes in issue, only sales within the
United Kingdom were regarded as actionable in the United Kingdom; sales
abroad would have to be pursued elsewhere, unless foreign claims could be
asserted in the English court under the Brussels Convention. Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 29, 1996, 1998 O.J. (C 27) 1 [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
17. See generally Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims,
Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 100 (Dec. 1, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=628241 (discussing problems arising from patents
written to cover modern technologies which attempt to bring the distributed
acts of different users around the globe into the ambit of a territorial legal
system that looks for a single infringer).
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more, rights holders can use the necessity of successive actions
to their advantage, to wear users down by bringing actions seriatim, hoping eventually to win in a big enough market to
make the competitor’s continuing activity everywhere unprofitable. This is a particular problem for small businesses that lack
the legal and technical sophistication necessary to avoid becoming amenable to suit in foreign fora and the resources to fight
multiple suits. To the extent that start-ups are especially responsible for innovation, these problems may significantly affect the public interest by chilling creativity and technological
progress.18
A convention of the type originally contemplated at the
Hague would solve many of these problems. The Internet has
created difficult personal jurisdiction cases for all courts, and
these are further complicated by the intangible nature of the
rights at issue.19 Thus, it would be quite helpful to have an international agreement on which activities support the assertion
of adjudicatory authority. Further, courts have taken different
positions on their power to rectify and to stop (on both a permanent and temporary basis) injuries that occur outside their territories.20 Clarity on that issue would thus also be welcome.
18. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. v. Altai, Inc., 126 F.3d 365, 369–71 (2d Cir.
1997) (successive suits for infringing trade secrets brought in the United
States and France not barred by res judicata).
19. See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119,
1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (setting out an early test for jurisdiction based on Internet transactions); Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Centers,
Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 399–400 (4th Cir. 2003) (discussing later cases). For state
court cases, see, e.g., Pavlovich v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 58
P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002); Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002). For an
example of a foreign court grappling with similar issues see Dow Jones & Co.
v. Gutnick, (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575 (Austl.). See generally Allan R. Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process Through the Lens of
Regulatory Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 411 (2004).
20. For example, in the United States, the single-publication rule, which
requires the assertion of all claims for libel in a single action, is said to protect
the interests of the media, see Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770,
777 (1984); arguably a similar rule should protect media defendants in intellectual property actions. By contrast, however, the EU bars the assertion of
extraterritorial libel claims in courts that are not situated at the residence of
the defendant. See Shevill v. Presse Alliance S.A., [1995] 2 A.C. 18 (H.L.
1995) (Eng.). There is similar controversy over cross-border relief issues. See,
e.g., Turner v. Grovit, 1 All. E.R. 960 (H.L. 2002) (Eng.); Grupo Mexicano de
Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999); Symposium,
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But even more is possible. A convention tailored to the needs of
the intellectual property community could also make the adjudication of international infringements efficient. It could facilitate cooperation among courts entertaining parts of the same
series of transactions or create avenues for consolidating cases,
thereby saving judicial resources on a world-wide basis. It
would also reduce the private cost of enforcing intellectual
property rights and improve the deterrent effect of the law. At
the same time, an integrated system would prevent plaintiffs
from harassing lawful users, safeguard free speech interests,
and assure that materials in the public domain are genuinely
available for use.
Admittedly, the ALI cannot fulfill all of these goals. Because
the drafters do not represent states, its provisions will not be
enacted directly into law. However, as a set of principles, the
project can demonstrate how national courts could be used to
create an efficient method for adjudicating international disputes. Thus, the hope is that states will be inspired to return to
the bargaining table, where they can use the work as a template for action. The Principles can also have an impact as “soft
law.” In some cases, they could be followed by courts unilaterally or adopted through the consent of the parties—in their contract or at the time of litigation. A set of principles also creates
a focus for future discussion by the intellectual property community. Indeed, it is heartening to see that similar projects are
proceeding in other arenas.21

Copyright's Long Arm: Enforcing U.S. Copyrights Abroad, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.
REV. 45 (2004); John Gladstone Mills III, A Transnational Patent Convention
for the Acquisition and Enforcement of International Rights, 84 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 83, 85 (2002).
21. The International Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property [hereinafter AIPPI] has polled its membership on these issues and has
adopted a Resolution proposing approaches to jurisdiction, choice of law, and
enforcement of judgments that are generally consistent with the ALI Principles. See AIPPI, Report Q174: Jurisdiction and applicable law in the case of
cross-border infringement (infringing acts) of intellectual property rights,
AIPPI 2003 Y.B., at 827, available at http://www.aippi.org/reports/resol
utions/Q174_E.pdf. There is also a group of intellectual property lawyers in
Europe, led by the Max Planck Institute, working on an International Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments, which deals with
many of the same issues. Its principal author, Annette Kur, is an advisor on
the ALI project.
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II. THE ALI PROJECT
Given this background, the contours of the ALI project are
largely predictable. After defining the areas of intellectual
property law to which the Principles will apply, the issues dealt
with at the Hague are addressed. First, the jurisdictional provisions specify the sort of contacts a defendant must have with
a state to become amenable to suit in its courts. These provisions also delimit the scope of the court’s authority to hear and
act upon claims arising within and without its territory. Second, the Principles set out rules on when, and on what terms,
judgments based on these bases of jurisdiction should be enforced. However, the project also departs from the Hague approach in significant ways. It includes procedures for simplifying the adjudication of world-wide disputes, providing two
methods, cooperation and consolidation. Further, as described
more fully in the next section, it lays out criteria for determining the law to be applied in international contexts.
A. Scope
The Principles apply to all intellectual property rights, including not only copyright, patents, and trademarks, but also
neighboring rights, trade secrets, domain names and rights
stemming from concepts of unfair competition. The notion is to
cast a broad net, so that courts enjoy maximum flexibility to
structure litigation in ways that encourage efficiency. However,
it is recognized that drawing lines can be difficult. Accordingly,
it is contemplated that early in the litigation process, the court,
helped by the parties, will determine whether, and to what extent, the Principles will apply.
B. Jurisdiction
As is standard in American jurisprudence, the Principles distinguish between bases of general and specific jurisdiction. A
third type of jurisdiction, designed to improve efficiency, has
also been added. Because the ALI project sets out multiple
bases of adjudicatory authority but does not establish a preference among them, it differs sharply from the 1999 Draft Hague
Convention and also from European practice. However, this
approach was considered necessary to achieve the project’s
overall goal: a multiplicity of jurisdictional predicates creates
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the flexibility needed to situate each case in the court best able
to provide complete justice to all the litigants. Nonetheless, it is
also understood that one of the attractions of a set of Principles
is that it can provide some assurance that jurisdiction will not
be asserted inappropriately. Thus, the project does not opt for
complete flexibility. Instead, it follows the Hague approach by
defining certain bases of jurisdiction as prohibited.22
1. General Jurisdiction
The two provisions on general jurisdiction create authority to
hear all claims against a defendant no matter where they arise.
Both should be familiar to American lawyers: the defendant is
subject to general jurisdiction at its habitual residence (domicile) and in any court where a general appearance is made.
Thus, a defendant whose habitual residence is Germany, who
engages in activity in France and Germany that leads to harm
in France, Germany, the United States, and Japan, can be sued
in Germany for the harm claimed in all four states. A general
appearance in a court of any of the other countries will similarly
create jurisdiction over claims to harm everywhere.
2. Specific Jurisdiction
Unlike the general jurisdiction provisions, which are based
entirely on general law, the three principles that deal with specific jurisdiction take into account the special needs of the intellectual property community.
The first provision (which in a sense lies midway between
general and specific jurisdiction), expresses a position in favor
of party autonomy. It makes defendants amenable to suit in
any place agreed to in a choice of forum clause.23 Some of the
language in the current draft is essentially a placeholder for

22. As with the Draft Hague Convention, there is a residual grey area
where every state has authority to make its own decisions on enforcement.
23. This has the flavor of general jurisdiction because the claims need not
arise from the contract directly. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,
499 U.S. 585 (1991) (recognizing the enforceability of a forum selection clause
in a consumer contract in a torts case for negligent operation of a vessel).
However, unless the contract was badly drafted, the amenability to suit would
be restricted to claims arising from the relationship created by the contract
containing the forum selection clause.
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changes that will likely be made to conform the Principles to
the choice of forum convention currently under negotiation at
the Hague. However, there is also language that will not likely
be conformed to the new Hague instrument because it is intended to tailor the law to intellectual property transactions. In
these transactions, there is a clear need for agreements that
reduce the jurisdictional exposure of distributors of digitized
information, but also a concern that nonnegotiated licenses
(clickwraps and shrinkwraps) will overreach and require adjudication in a forum which is burdensome to the other side (and
which applies law recognizing the enforceability of choice of forum agreements24).
To deal with this problem, the Principles reject the Hague’s
distinction between consumer and business transactions, and
instead differentiate between negotiated and nonnegotiated licenses. Judgments based on forum selection clauses in all negotiated agreements are enforceable, even when individuals are
involved. However, for nonnegotiated agreements, forum selection clauses will be effective only if the forum chosen is reasonable under rules set out by the Principles themselves (as distinguished from the place where enforcement of the agreement is
sought). If the agreement is reasonable when judged in light of
the expectations, location, sophistication, and resources of the
parties, in particular the weaker party, the interests of the
relevant states, the availability of online dispute resolution, and
the expertise of the court chosen, the forum selection will be
honored; otherwise, it will be disregarded. In the end, the hope
is that the risk of losing the benefits of forum selection clauses
will encourage those who draft nonnegotiated agreements to
make fair choices.
A second provision covers contract actions generally (that is,
claims arising from contracts that do not contain enforceable
forum selection clauses). This provision gives the courts of a
state whose rights are in issue adjudicatory authority over the
defendant. However, the court’s power is limited to local
24. Currently, courts tend to use forum law to decide whether to enforce
forum selection clauses, with the result that it is difficult to predict when they
will be enforced and to know whether the nondrafting party will be sufficiently protected. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306
F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); Evolution Online Sys., Inc. v. Koninklijke PTT Nederland N.V., 145 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1998).
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claims. For example, a dispute over an agreement licensing
world-wide trademark rights can be litigated in France, even if
the defendant is not a domiciliary of France—but the only
claims that can be adjudicated are those that deal with the
French marks. As with forum selection clauses, this provision
can be used for nonnegotiated agreements only when the contract is reasonable under criteria set out in the Principles.
The third head of specific jurisdiction involves one of the most
controversial issues addressed by the Principles: jurisdiction
over infringement actions. In a variation on the traditional approach in the United States, this provision creates a sliding
scale, with the level of adjudicatory authority dependent on the
nature of the forum state’s connection with the dispute.
When the defendant has “substantially acted” in the state,
the court’s jurisdiction over the defendant extends to all claims
of harm arising out of the defendant’s in-state activity, no matter where the harm is felt. For example, a defendant who is
habitually resident in Germany, who operates a server in Angola, where the plaintiff is habitually resident, and who uses
that server to distribute infringing content to Portugal, Brazil,
and Mozambique will be amenable to suit in Angola for all
claims arising out of the activity in Angola, including claims
pertaining to harm in Portugal, Brazil, and Mozambique.
When there is less connection to the state, the court’s authority is more circumscribed and the ambit of the case is determined by whether the plaintiff is bringing the case in the forum
where it is resident. It has, however, proved difficult to draw
the line between activity that occurs as a result of the defendant’s purposeful availment of the forum’s benefits and activity
that results from the unilateral actions of others. In the former
situation, there is universal sentiment that jurisdiction is justified, whereas in the latter, there is a sense that asserting jurisdiction is inappropriate. In part, the problem is linguistic, for it
is hard to describe what the defendant must be doing to be
amenable to jurisdiction without involving the court in difficult
determinations of intent. Various formulations have been considered, including “directing activity,” “targeting the jurisdiction,” and “endeavoring to direct.”
To a large extent, however, the problem is normative. It revolves around questions of how much responsibility actors
should bear to avoid jurisdictions in which they do not wish to
be sued and whether it is reasonable to require the same avoid-
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ance activities of all intellectual property users, no matter their
size, wealth, and degree of technological and legal sophistication. For example, it is fairly clear that a German domiciliary
who runs a website in Angola in the Portuguese language,
which makes available music that appeals specifically to a Portuguese audience, should be subject to jurisdiction in Brazil for
harm occurring there. It is less clear that this defendant should
also be subject to jurisdiction in New York where, unknown to
the defendant, there is a substantial diaspora of Portuguese
speakers who migrated from Madeira and who found the website on its own.
In the current draft, a conservative approach is taken. The
court where the action is filed must scrutinize the defendant’s
activities to determine whether it is reasonable to believe it was
directing the alleged infringement to the state. Since “directing” is defined as initiating or maintaining “contacts, business,
or an audience ... on a regular basis,” businesses with sporadic
contacts will not be amenable to the court’s power. Furthermore, the defendant is given an opportunity to avoid the court’s
authority by demonstrating that it took steps reasonable under
the circumstances to avoid acting in the state. If the defendant
is found to have directed infringement towards a state, then a
plaintiff who is a resident of that state, may assert claims for all
the harm resulting from the defendant’s activity, no matter
where that harm actually occurred. If the plaintiff is not a state
resident, then only local harm may be asserted.
3. Jurisdiction for Simplification
The remaining two bases of jurisdiction are designed to facilitate efficient adjudication. These grounds of jurisdiction may
be unfamiliar to Americans, but they are based on the Brussels
Regulation and are thus known to Europeans.25 The first provision would expand the authority of the court where one defendant is habitually resident to include power over other defendants who are enmeshed in the same transactions. It applies
only when the other nonresident defendants have some contact
with the forum state and separate adjudication of claims
against the various defendants would create a risk that the par25. See Brussels Regulation, supra note 6, art. 6(1)–(2).
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26
ties will be subject to inconsistent outcomes. In such cases,
the scope of the lawsuit extends to all harms flowing from the
joint activity, no matter where it occurs. The second provision
pertains to third-party actions, and allows a local defendant to
add parties who are liable to the defendant for all or part of the
judgment the defendant suffers. Again, the court’s power extends to harm flowing from the alleged activity, no matter
where it occurs.

4. Prohibited Bases of Jurisdiction
Finally, as with the Draft Hague Convention, the Principles
list a series of bases that are considered inappropriate predicates for adjudicatory authority. These include jurisdiction
based solely on nationality, temporary residence or presence, or
service of process within the territory.
C. Subject Matter Authority
Consistent with U.S. law, the Principles draw a distinction
between subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Local law
supplies the rules on subject matter authority. However, to
achieve efficiency, the Principles suggest that where possible
under local law, and consistent with the scope of personal jurisdiction set out in the Principles, courts should extend their subject matter reach to cover all claims and counterclaims arising
from the transaction that gave rise to the initial claims. Although there have been suggestions that efficiency should be
forced on the parties by making related claims and counterclaims compulsory, the absence of well-developed doctrines of
claim and issue preclusion in some parts of the world militate
against that approach.
In addition, the Principles contemplate that courts will exercise their authority to hear declaratory judgment actions and to
provide provisional relief. In the latter case, the Principles suggest that the court hearing the action exercise its competence to
26. Cf. Expandable Grafts P’ship v. Boston Scientific, B.V., Court of Appeal
of the Hague (1999) F.S.R. 352, ¶ 19 (consolidating cases when the defendants
are part of the same group of companies). The Principles recognize three
types of inconsistency: redundant liability, judgments that undermine one
another, and judgments to which the parties cannot simultaneously conform
their behavior.
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issue any protective order necessary, including those that cross
national borders. Other courts are to limit their power to issue
preliminary measures to actions that affect only their own territories.
D. Simplification
As noted earlier, a key value of this project is its capacity to
facilitate resolution of global disputes. The Principles offer two
methods for simplifying such disputes, cooperation and consolidation, both of which draw on American and European methods
of aggregation.27 Both are thought to require some degree of
supervision; the Principles use the lis pendens doctrine to
choose the supervisor. Under this provision (and subject to an
exception explained below), initial decisions on simplification
are to be made by the court where the first of the related actions is filed (the court with “supervisory authority”). These
decisions include whether to simplify, the method of simplification, and in the case of consolidation, the place of simplification.
Since these decisions can be opportunities for delay, there are
also provisions aimed at minimizing dilatory practices.
1. Whether
Initially, the court must decide whether the world-wide actions are closely enough connected to benefit from coordinated
treatment. It is expected that such will be the case whenever
two or more lawsuits in different countries arise from connected
transactions.
2. How
The decision on how to simplify involves a choice between cooperation and consolidation. The Principles set out criteria for
making this selection. These include such matters as whether
there is a court with sufficient power over all of the litigants
and enough authority to award the relief requested to make
consolidation an option; whether there is a court with special
expertise in the issues in contention; the impact of the decision
27. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (change of venue); Brussels Regulation,
supra note 6, art. 27–28 (lis pendens and stays of related actions); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (forum non conveniens).
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on the resources of the parties; and the degree of cooperation
that can be expected.
The cooperative approach is inspired by recent developments
in international bankruptcy litigation, where the parties, with
the aid of the courts where bankruptcy petitions are pending,
develop a cooperative plan to coordinate the distribution of
world-wide assets.28 Although intellectual property disputes are
significantly different from bankruptcy in that they are not
zero-sum games, the litigants still have substantial incentives
to cooperate. For example, cooperation will likely be appropriate in registered rights cases, particularly patent cases, where
the laws are very different, and foreign (and in some cases, domestic) courts lack the capacity to order a patent office to act on
a finding of invalidity. In such cases, litigation is best situated
in each country in which rights are registered. At the same
time, however, substantial benefits could be achieved if, before
any trial commences, the parties agree to rely on a single examination of the inventor, choose to focus their disputes on the
same embodiments of the accused device, and stipulate to the
documents and practices that constitute the prior art. Although
courts could still arrive at different decisions on validity or infringement, there is no real inconsistency because the laws applied are different and, in many cases, exploitation in one territory is (at least in theory) unaffected by exploitation elsewhere.29

28. See, e.g., American Law Institute, TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY:
COOPERATION AMONG THE NAFTA COUNTRIES (2003) (attempting to develop
such a method for managing bankruptcy within NAFTA countries), available
at http://www.ali.org/ali/trans-insolv.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2005);
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO
ENACTMENT (United Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 1997),
http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/insolven/insolvencyindex.htm; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, International Judicial Negotiation, 38 TEX. INT’L L. J. 567
(2003); Frederick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, 23 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 31 (2001).
29. In practice this may not be so. Although the problem is not as dramatic as inconsistent judgments about whether a work can be distributed on
the Internet, in fact, prohibiting the sale of patented articles in one jurisdiction can affect decisions on exploitation elsewhere because of factors such as
economies in the scale of production and the demand for interoperable products.
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In contrast, copyright cases involving Internet distribution
may be better suited to the other approach, consolidation of all
cases arising from a series of transactions in a single forum. In
such cases, there are real risks that conflicting judgments will
be entered—for instance, that one court will consider a transmission infringing while another court holds the same transmission noninfringing; or that more than one court will levy
royalties on the identical communication.30 Resources can be
saved and inconsistency avoided if all cases are transferred to a
single court, which can then determine how best to deal with
the interests of the states involved.31
3. Where
If the court decides on cooperation, then it will develop a plan
for adjudicating the world-wide dispute with input from the
parties and the other courts involved. On the other hand, when
a court decides to consolidate, then it must next select the place
where the action will be heard. If the parties’ contracts selected
a unique forum, it will likely be chosen (subject to the usual caveat on nonnegotiated agreements). However, the goal is to
situate the case in the court most closely connected to the parties and dispute, and most convenient to the witnesses. Preference is also given to a tribunal specialized in the field at issue
(for example, a specialized patent court for a case involving only
patent issues) and to a court in a state that belongs to the WTO
and is therefore internationally accountable for its actions.

30. Two situations raising the problem of inconsistency are presented in
the Grokster and iCraveTV litigation, where the defendants could easily have
been exonerated in one country (for example, the Netherlands or Canada),
while found liable in another (such as the United States). See MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.), cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v.
iCraveTV, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1831 (W.D.Pa. 2000). For a case raising the potential for stacking royalties, see Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Ass’n. of Internet Providers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427
(Can.).
31. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National
Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000).
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4. Dilatory Practices
It has been suggested that the coordination approach, while
valuable in theory, is vulnerable in practice because it provides
infringers with multiple opportunities to engage in sharp practice and to delay adjudication. The Principles deal with these
concerns in several ways. The decision to coordinate adjudication must be made early in the proceedings; if a decision is
made not to coordinate or no decision at all is made, then each
action can proceed where initially filed. Furthermore, no court
is stripped of its authority. This is clearly the case under the
cooperative approach; it is also true of consolidation because
once a decision to consolidate is made, other courts suspend activity—they do not dismiss. If the consolidated case does not
proceed in a reasonable time, then the individual actions can go
forward. In addition, there is an important exception to the lis
pendens rule: the court where a declaratory judgment action is
filed is not treated as the court with supervisory authority. Instead, an intellectual property holder can file a coercive suit
that, essentially, vetoes any attempt by the defendant to use a
“torpedo action” (a declaration for a finding of noninfringement
or invalidity filed in a court known for delay32) to postpone adjudication.
To put this another way, the Principles improve upon the
current system because the power to transfer cases carries with
it the ability to choose a court that is expert and speedy. Moreover, the system as a whole reduces sharp practices by eliminating the benefits of forum shopping. Because there are many
places where defendants are subject to adjudicatory authority,
there is little advantage in situating activities or bringing declaratory actions in “information havens.” By the same token,
plaintiffs may not receive much benefit from suing in “information hells” because such cases are subject to transfer to a more

32. For further discussion, see Linda J. Silberman, The Impact of Jurisdictional Rules and Recognition Practice on International Business Transactions:
the U.S. Regime, 26 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 327, 344–45 (2004); Trevor C. Hartley,
How to Abuse the Law And (Maybe) Come Out on Top: Bad-Faith Proceedings
Under the Brussels Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention, in LAW AND
JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN,
73–81 (James A. R. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds., 2002).
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appropriate forum. As explained more fully below, control over
applicable law further reduces the effects of forum shopping.
E. Enforcement
Although one of the ultimate goals of the project is to create a
platform for enforcing judgments, this section has yet to receive
focused attention by the Reporters or by their Advisers. To a
significant extent, the current language is a placeholder. As
much as possible, it will be conformed to any instrument that
the Hague succeeds in promulgating. Even more important, the
American Law Institute will likely expect the Principles to
agree generally with its own Project on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Analysis and Proposed Federal
Statute. This work, which was formerly entitled the International Jurisdiction and Judgments Project, has been under consideration at the ALI for several years. It sets out uniform criteria for determining the recognition and enforcement of judgments in the United States; this Project is to be readied for
adoption by the Institute in May 2005.
However, a few features of the current draft will probably endure. First, the Principles give the court where enforcement is
sought responsibility to act as a check on the court that rendered the judgment. Most obviously, the enforcing court cannot
enforce judgments predicated on prohibited bases of jurisdiction. In addition, the enforcing court must verify that the defendant received notice of the original action; in cases where the
jurisdictional predicate is a general appearance, it must also
verify that the defendant indeed waived objections to personal
jurisdiction; if the rendering court was chosen in a nonnegotiated contract, the issue of reasonableness must be reviewed.
Further, courts are to refuse to enforce judgments rendered in
conflict with the Principles’ lis pendens provisions and with decisions the court with supervisory authority makes on cooperation or consolidation. Thus, for example, if the first action was
filed in France and that court decided to consolidate the worldwide dispute in Germany, then decisions rendered by any court
other than the German court should not be enforced. Although
this system of second-guessing may appear destabilizing of decisions and is certainly contrary to practice in many places, it is
intended to compensate for the lack of hierarchical supervision
present in other adjudicatory systems.
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Second, the Principles include features that recognize the
special import of intellectual property values, and the impact of
intellectual property rights on culture, health, and well-being.
Thus, the court where enforcement is sought is given some authority to vary remedies to conform the outcome to local needs.
It can refuse to enforce noncompensatory awards unknown to
its own law as well as awards that are grossly excessive when
judged by domestic conditions. It can also decline to order injunctive relief when safety, health or local cultural policies are
at issue. In addition, the Principles recognize a general, but
circumscribed, exception for judgments contrary to local public
policy.
III. INVITING CONFLICTS
As noted earlier, one of the main differences between the ALI
Principles on the one hand, and other enforcement regimes and
initiatives (full faith and credit, the Brussels Regulation, the
Hague instruments, and the ALI Project on Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments), and one of their most innovative features, is the articulation of principles on applicable
law. Further, the project provides an impetus for courts to apply the principles by denying enforcement to judgments that are
based on choices of law “manifestly inconsistent” with the rules
set out.
The inclusion of principles on applicable law may seem remarkable at first blush. Not only are conflicts rules missing
from other enforcement regimes, they are also largely absent
from the international intellectual property instruments currently in force.33 Bill Patry has suggested that the reason for
their omissions may be that until recently, there were so few
cases involving multistate contacts that courts were never pre33. Admittedly, there are a few provisions of international intellectual
property law that arguably have choice-of-law overtones. Thus, the Nimmers
have argued (unconvincingly) that national treatment provisions create choice
of law rules on ownership. See Patry, supra note 12, at 413. Further, the
Berne Convention refers to the “law of the country where protection is
claimed.” Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
art. 5(2), Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99–27. However,
it is not clear whether this means the country where infringement occurred or
the country where the case is being litigated. Accordingly, if this is a choice of
law rule, it is one that is very poorly drafted.
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34

sented with a choice: “there was only the law of the forum.”
Alternatively, it may be that the paucity of global cases embedded concepts of territoriality so deeply into intellectual property
jurisprudence, it was rarely evident that choices were being
made.35 However, as the prospect of international disputes has
come to the fore, it has become increasingly clear that the situation has changed dramatically.36
Thus, one of the reasons negotiations over a general convention at the Hague broke down was that Internet cases—
including especially cases involving transactions in intangible
works—were beginning to proliferate.37 Consideration of how
these disputes would fare under the Hague’s jurisdictional provisions demonstrated that there would surely be cases of overlapping adjudicatory authority. Further, it became clear that
these overlaps would do more than draw litigants into tribunals
far from their homes. When cases are litigated in far-flung fora,
there is a real prospect that activity would be judged under law
different (possibly unforeseeably different) from the law of the
location at which the activity was conducted.38 For example,
34. Patry, supra note 12, at 385.
35. Indeed, in an early presentation of the ALI Principles to the Advisers, a
prominent jurist argued that there was no need for choice of law rules because
the territorial principle was so obviously applicable.
36. See generally MIREILLE VAN EECHOUD, CHOICE OF LAW IN COPYRIGHT
AND RELATED RIGHTS: ALTERNATIVES TO LEX PROTECTIONIS (2003); Paul Edward
Geller, Conflicts of Laws in Copyright Cases: Infringement and Ownership
Issues, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 315 (2004).
37. See, e.g., Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575 (Austl.);
Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002); Revell v. Lidov,
317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002).
38. This danger is reflected in the following question:
Regarding the Hague treaty and copyright and fair use on the Internet, what national laws would apply if I download an article, data,
music or software from a European web site, to my US based computer, and make an unauthorized use, for teaching, reverse engineering, commentary, parody or some other use that would be fair use in
the US, but possibly not fair use in Europe…Could I be sued in
Europe for violating the European copyright laws? Would a judgment be collected against me in the USA?
E-mail from James Love, Consumer Project on Technology, to Mary Streett,
U.S. Dept. of Commerce (Sept. 29, 2000), available at http://lists.essent
ial.org/pipermail/info-policy-notes/2000q3/000024.html; Cherie Dawson, Note,
Creating Borders on the Internet: Free Speech, the United States, and International Jurisdiction, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 637, 639 (2004); Nathan Garnett, Com-
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U.S. software producers began to realize that foreign use of
their programs could expose their reverse engineering activities
to adjudication under bodies of law that do not recognize a fair
use defense.
Of course, one could hope that courts would use restraint
when applying local law to foreign activity. For example, in F.
Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., the U.S. Supreme
Court recently held that U.S. antitrust law cannot be interpreted to cover foreign harm suffered by foreign defendants.39
Noting that the decision to apply law extraterritorially requires
heightened sensitivity to comity interests, Justice Breyer stated
that courts are responsible for making sure that “conflicting
laws of different nations work together in harmony—a harmony
particularly needed in today’s highly interdependent world.”40
Unfortunately, not every case has a fact pattern similar to
the one in Empagran. In that case, it was assumed that foreign
and domestic injuries were independent of one another.41 International intellectual property cases are not always so easily
teased apart. When the behavior in one place is necessarily
intertwined with activity in another, even the highest regard
for comity will produce overlapping prescriptive authority. As
the Supreme Court of Canada recently noted in a case involving
a transmission originating in Canada that was downloaded in
the United States, “the answer lies in the making of international or bilateral agreements, not in national courts straining
to find some jurisdictional infirmity in either state.”42 The bottom line is that without an international agreement, there are
activities that will inevitably be subject to scrutiny under more
than one body of law, leading to the possibility of unforeseen
results, or even worse: to multiple liability;43 to exposure to
judgments mandating inconsistent behavior; and to the imposi-

ment, Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick: Will Australia’s Long Jurisdictional Reach
Chill Internet Speech World-Wide, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 61, 68 (2004).
39. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004).
40. Id. at 2366.
41. Id. at 2363–72.
42. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Ass’n. of Internet Providers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, 462 (Can.).
43. This was the specific problem in SOCAN. See id.
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tion of one country’s cultural and industrial innovation policies
on another sovereign state.44
Nor is it always the case that restraint is the right answer.
As noted earlier, there are patent claims that contemplate activity in more than one location; unless the law of some nation
is applied extraterritorially, these inventions could be practiced
without ever incurring infringement liability.45 Furthermore,
one way to deal with the messy problem of multi-jurisdictional
infringements is to bring a single case in one jurisdiction and
argue that its law should control activity occurring elsewhere.
For example, there have been both copyright and trademark
cases in which U.S. law has been applied to foreign activity on
the theory that the extraterritorial activity affected U.S. markets.46 The result was only rough justice (since the law at the
location of the activity was not consulted), but that may be better than slow and expensive justice (for example, through suits
in multiple locations).
Extraterritorial applications of law have other advantages as
well. Thus, it has been forcefully argued that if the rights in
each intellectual product were controlled by the law of a single
jurisdiction, world-wide negotiations would be vastly facilitated.47 For instance, it would be far easier to draft a global license covering the use of a U.S. movie in all media if there were
no need to be concerned with the differences between U.S. law
on work for hire and foreign rules mandating employee owner-

44. Cf. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 379
F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004) (letting stand a French order that prohibited a U.S.
Internet service provider from displaying Nazi materials on sites accessible in
both France and the United States).
45. See supra text accompanying note 14.
46. See, e.g., Los Angeles News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149
F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998); Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing Ltd., 843 F.2d
67 (2d Cir. 1988) (copyright); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733 (2d
Cir. 1994) (trademark). See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, The Private International Law of Copyright in an Era of Technological Change, 273 RECUEIL DES
COURS 322–48 (1998); Jane C. Ginsburg, Comment, Extraterritoriality and
Multiterritoriality in Copyright Infringement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 587 (1997).
For an aptly named piece, see Nathan R. Wollman, Maneuvering Through the
Landmines of Multiterritorial Copyright Litigation: How to Avoid the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality When Attempting to Recover for the Foreign Exploitation of U.S. Copyrighted Works, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 343 (2002).
47. See, e.g., Patry, supra note 12, at 427–34.
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48
ship; with a German law that bars the transfer of rights in
undiscovered media;49 or with France’s elaborate moral rights
50
doctrine. Since facilitating such transactions would make information products more readily available, these arguments are
not solely about the interests of rights holders and licensees. In
fact, they have strong public policy overtones as well.
With these concerns in mind, this project has from its outset
considered the issue of applicable law. Initially, the problem
was dealt with through the back door, by making a judgment
unenforceable if the law chosen was “arbitrary or unreasonable.”51 However, it quickly became evident that this formulation would be unworkable. Because there has been such a paucity of debate over choice of law rules in intellectual property
cases, there is little shared understanding of what should count
as a reasonable choice; if the issue remained open in the enforcing court, there was sure to be extensive relitigation. The current version of the project therefore confronts the problem headon by including provisions on applicable law.
Recent meetings of the Advisers have been partly devoted to
working these rules out. As of this writing, it is fair to say that
the hardest question is deciding between traditional notions of
territoriality (which might enhance the appeal of the Principles
for conservatively minded jurists) and a uniformity approach
that would associate a work with a single nation’s law (and
break new ground in international intellectual property jurisprudence). As explained below, the Principles currently split
the difference, depending on the practicalities of the situation;
the relative advantages of adhering to, or departing from, tradition; and the national interests involved in the rule in issue.

48. The U.S. rule, found in 17 U.S.C. § 201(b), is relatively rare among
domestic copyright laws.
49. § 31(4) UrhG, available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/Urh
G.htm (1965 German Copyright Act). See generally Adolf Dietz, Germany, in
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (David Nimmer et al. eds.,
2004) § 4[3][a].
50. Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle, art. L. 121-1, available at http://
www.unesco.org/culture/copy/copyright/france/sommaire2.html (France’s Intellectual Property Code, as last amended by the Law of June 18, 2003).
51. Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 1072.
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A. Existence, Infringement, and Scope of Rights and Remedies
As the draft now stands, the approach to these issues is
largely territorial. For economic rights, this means that each of
these matters is controlled by the law of each country in which
an infringement occurs. Thus, for example, French law would
apply to patent infringements in France, but U.S. law would
apply when the same work is infringed in the United States.
As noted earlier, there was a strong temptation to apply the
law of the country most connected to the work, no matter where
infringement occurred, for example, to apply French law to all
of these issues when a work is created in France by French
domiciliaries. Not only would this simplify transactions, it
would also maximize each nation’s ability to encourage production within its territory and protect its creative citizens in the
manner each regards as most appropriate. The decision to follow the traditional territorial approach was based on several
considerations. This rule does the least damage to the ability of
each state to influence the availability of intellectual products
within its borders. By mimicking the outcomes that would obtain when litigation is pursued state-by-state (and each court
uses its own state’s law), this approach is likely to make the
Principles more readily accepted. Furthermore, since states
lack the capacity to alter foreign registrations, the uniformity
approach would be difficult to apply to questions involving the
validity of registered rights. Of course, a mixed system that
treats registered rights differently from other forms of intellectual property rights could have been adopted. However, it was
thought that this would be problematic because many economically important works implicate multiple intellectual property
regimes. Computer games, for example, may include copyrightprotected animation and music, characters protected by rights
of publicity, patented software, and marketing symbols that are
protected by trademark law.52
The Principles do, however, recognize several exceptions to
territoriality. First, for noneconomic rights, the applicable law
is that of the territory in which the author is habitually resident
at the time the harm occurred. In a sense, this is a territorial

52. See e.g., Tom Loftus, Stars Seek More Control Over Video Games (Mar.
12, 2004), available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4223361.
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rule because it stems from the perception that noneconomic
harm occurs where the author is found. However, the result is
that one nation’s law applies to all violations. For instance, if a
copyrighted work authored by a Frenchman were utilized,
moral rights issues would be analyzed under French law, irrespective of whether the work was used in France or in the
United States.53
The other exceptions are more conventional departures from
territoriality. Where territorial law cannot be ascertained, the
law of the forum applies. More important, in cases where the
dispute is closely connected to a particular law, or to a preexisting legal relationship subject to another law, the applicable law
will be that of the connection or relationship. Further, when
use of protected works spills over national borders, and the decision is made to consolidate adjudication, applying every
state’s law may become unduly burdensome. In such cases, the
court can choose to simplify the dispute by utilizing the laws
most closely associated with the dispute. The criteria for choosing which laws will be applied include the locus of the plaintiff’s
and defendant’s activities.
These exceptions may not be as great a departure from tradition as may first appear. Courts usually use their own forum’s
law in the case of uncertainty. In practice, parties facing multiple infringements often forgo adjudication in countries that are
not closely connected to their prime business activities and
needs.54 Furthermore, it is not unknown for a plaintiff to sue a
defendant in its largest market, hoping that a loss of that revenue will put the defendant out of business everywhere. In effect, the law of the largest market winds up controlling availability in all markets.
The final departure from territoriality is for agreements in
which the parties choose to submit all or part of their dispute to
the law of a single national law. As in other areas, the Princi53. Traditional conflicts scholars would call this a rule of personality, see
EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 17.83 (4th ed. 2000).
54. See, e.g., C.F. (Jm.) 41/92, Qimron v. Shanks, 69(iii) P.M. 10 & C.A.
2760/93, 2811/93, Eisenman v. Qimron, 54(3) P.D. 817, discussed in David
Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 38
HOUS. L. REV. 1, 101 (2001); Neil Wilkof, Copyright, Moral Rights and the
Choice of Law: Where Did the Dead Sea Scrolls Court Go Wrong?, 38 HOUS. L.
REV. 463, 467 (2001).

File: DreyfussMACRO.06.16.05..doc

2005]

Created on: 6/16/2005 3:14 PM

WHY INVITE CONFLICTS?

Last Printed: 6/17/2005 1:33 PM

845

ples favor party autonomy, but nonetheless circumscribe it in a
variety of ways. First, the validity and maintenance of registered rights, the existence, scope and duration of rights, and the
formal requirements for recordation cannot be varied contractually. Nonnegotiated agreements are subject to the usual
scrutiny for reasonableness. Finally, these agreements cannot
be enforced if to do so would affect the rights of third parties.
B. Initial Ownership
In this area, the decision has been made to adopt the uniformity approach as much as possible because assigning a single owner to world-wide rights greatly simplifies negotiations.
Thus, the law that is applicable to ownership of rights created
pursuant to a contract or preexisting relationship is that of the
contract or relationship. In most other cases, the law chosen is
that of the creator’s residence at the time of the work’s creation.
Where the law thus designated does not provide a solution, initial title is determined by the law of the place where the work is
first exploited.55
Unfortunately, there are a few situations where the territorial rule appears unavoidable. For registered rights, the law of
the country of regulation usually applies because regulation is
controlled by local registries. However, in cases where the work
was created pursuant to a contractual relationship, the law that
governs the relationship controls, on the theory that the parties
can be required to petition the place of registration for a change
in title if that is what the court orders them to do. The territorial approach is also used for unregistered trademark rights.
These rights arise directly out of local understanding of the
source of the goods and services to which the marketing symbols are attached. Thus, the law that appropriately controls
these rights is the law of the country in which the symbol at
issue is conveying marketing information.

55. For example, rights of publicity are not recognized in the United Kingdom. If provisions were not made for cases in which the place of the creator’s
residence does not supply a solution, then a U.S. advertiser could use images
of Prince William without authorization. Under the Principles, however,
ownership of the right of publicity would be determined by the law of the
United States if the images were first exploited there.

File: DreyfussMACRO.06.16.05..doc

846

Created on: 6/16/2005 3:14 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 6/17/2005 1:33 PM

[Vol. 30:3

C. Transfer of Rights
There are two issues that arise in connection with licenses
and assignments. The first is “transferability”: in some cases,
intellectual property rights are inalienable or only partially
alienable. As a result, there is a question on whether the right
can be transferred at all. For rights that are transferable, the
second issue is whether the parties took the steps necessary to
effect the transfer.
On the first issue, transferability, the Principles follow the
territorial approach. Thus, they provide that the transferability
is controlled by the law of the state whose rights are at issue.
For example, a global agreement that purports to transfer “all
rights in all media” made before the discovery of DVDs is not
effective to give the transferee rights to exploit the work on
DVDs in Germany because (as noted above) German copyright
bars transfers involving undiscovered media. This is so even if
the license is effective under German law to transfer rights in
known media (film, for example). The license will also operate
to transfer DVD rights in the same work for exploitation in the
United States.
As to the question of the effectiveness of transfers, here the
Principles depart from territoriality and rely on the law of the
agreement.56 Most sophisticated parties will include a choice of
law clause and this will be enforceable; in its absence, transfer
will be judged under the law of the country most closely connected to the work, presumptively, the assignor’s or licensor’s
habitual residence. As usual, nonnegotiated agreements (other
than collective bargaining agreements) are to be scrutinized for
reasonableness.

56. Transfer issues may not raise significant domestic policy concerns, see,
e.g., Univ. of Mass. v. Robl, 2004 WL 1725418 Mass. Dist. Ct. (Aug. 2, 2004)
(issue of ownership of patent rights allocated contractually does not raise a
federal question). Note, however, that there is a lurking question on the law
to be applied to characterizing a particular dispute as involving transferability
or effective transfer.
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D. Other Issues
There are at least two additional issues that call for further
examination. The first is the use of mandatory rules.57 Although unfamiliar to Americans, these rules are similar to public policy defenses to enforcement in that they operate as
trumps. However, unlike public policy decisions, they apply ab
initio—they go to the question of which law is used to adjudicate the case, and not to determine whether the outcome is acceptable in the place where enforcement is sought. Initially,
some thought was given to barring the use of mandatory rules.
However, in places that recognize them, the bar would require a
departure from traditional practice and is thus not likely to be
acceptable. Besides, the core territoriality principle may avoid
much of the controversy because it always permits a state to
apply its mandatory law to local infringements. If experience
with the Principles leads to greater appreciation of the interests
of other countries, the wisdom of their approaches, and the
benefits of comity, then the extraterritorial application of mandatory rules will abate of its own accord.
The second under-developed issue is secondary liability. In
the last few years, rights holders have begun to sue those who
facilitate distribution of intellectual products, claiming that
they are vicariously or contributorily liable for the infringements of users.58 As it stands, the Principles do not break this
issue out for special treatment. The theory is that since there
cannot be secondary liability without primary liability, the law
that governs primary liability should control. However, this
rationale only goes part way to solving the problem, for once
there is infringement, jurisdictions differ on the terms on which
57. See, e.g., CA Paris, 43 ch., 6 July 1989, R.I.D.A. 1990, no. 143, 329, note
Françon, Clunet 1989; CA Versailles, chs. réunies, 19 Dec. 1994, R.I.D.A.
1995, no. 164, 389, note André Kéréver.
58. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir.
2002): Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154
(9th Cir.), cert granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004); Kazaa Wins Dutch Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2003 at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/20/technology/
20suit.html?ex=1092196800&en=6a5d023b09dbe00e&ei=5070. Australia is
about to grapple with the same issue; see Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd.
v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd., (2004) FCA 183 (Federal Court of Australia); Australian Court Sets November Trial Date for Kazaa, 9 (BNA)
ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. 625 (July 14, 2004).
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59
they impose liability on third parties. Of course, there is reason to think that part of the attraction of secondary liability
actions is that they centralize litigation in one forum, thus
eliminating the need to sue individual users in each of the countries where they are located. This project may render some of
these secondary liability suits unnecessary in that the Principles envision joinder of individual users in a single action, or—
at the least—coordination of separate suits against them.

CONCLUSION
The Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and
Judgments in Transnational Disputes are intended to take up
Justice Breyer’s hope that “nations work together in [the] harmony ... needed in today’s highly interdependent world.” They
recognize, however, that in many cases, courts cannot always
assume interdependency away or cope with it on a unilateral
basis. More is required, from the parties involved in interstate
transactions, from the courts dealing with multinational disputes, and from interdependent nations themselves.
Although considerable work has gone into the drafting of
these Principles, it is important to emphasize that the project is
far from over. There are two lessons to be learned from the
Hague’s experience with a general convention on enforcing foreign judgments. The first is that input from all segments of the
domestic and international bar is critical. The problems facing
copyright, trademark, and patent holders are all somewhat different, as are the issues encountered in different parts of the
world. The multinational composition of the Principles’ Reporters and Advisers is an effort to consider these divergent viewpoints. The second lesson is that we are only beginning to fully
appreciate the issues posed by a truly global marketplace. As
the issues arising in an integrated economy are better understood, so too are the issues of an integrated system of dispute
resolution. The hope is that this effort will be a model for adoption. But if it only serves as a starting point for debate, it will
have served an important purpose.

59. For example, the rule set out in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 380
F.3d 1154 (2004), differs from that set out in In re Aimster Litigation, 334
F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).

